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Ever since the devastating 1918–1919 influenza pandemic, policy makers
have employed mathematical models to predict the course of epidemics
and pandemics in an effort to mitigate their worst impacts. But while Britain
has long been a pioneer of predictive epidemiology and disease modellers
occupied influential positions on key committees that advised the govern-
ment on its response to the coronavirus pandemic, as in 1918 Britain
mounted one of the least effective responses to Covid-19 of any country in
the world. Arguing that this ‘failure of expertise’ was the result of medical
and political complacency and over-reliance on disease models predicated
on influenza, this paper uses the lens of medical history to show how medi-
cal attitudes to Covid-19 mirrored those of the English medical profession in
1918. Rather than putting our faith in preventive medicine and statistical
technologies to predict the course of epidemics and dictate suppressive
measures in future, I argue we need to cultivate more profound forms of
imaginative engagement with infectious disease outbreaks that take account
of the long history of quarantines and the lived experiences of pandemics.
A useful starting point would be to recognize that while measures such as
the R° may be useful for calculating the reproductive rate of a virus, they
can never capture the full risks of pandemics or their social complexity.
Pandemics have a way of upsetting medical and scientific orthodoxies. A little
over 100 years ago a novel virus emerged from an unknown animal reservoir
and silently seeded itself in settlements around the world. Then, in the closing
months of the First World War, it suddenly began sickening people in Spain
and other parts of the Iberian Peninsula.
As with the novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, which emerged without warn-
ing in Wuhan, China, in December 2019, sparking the pandemic of Covid-19, at
first few medical commentators expressed concern about ‘Spanish influenza’.
On learning that the Spanish king, Alfonso XIII, was ill and that similar out-
breaks were being reported in England, the British Medical Journal
condemned the newspaper despatches fromMadrid as ‘alarmist’ and suggested
the culprit was most likely a type of ‘gastrointestinal influenza’ [1].
Most English medical commentators concurred. Influenza was a regular sea-
sonal visitor to the British Isles and in the previous 1847–1848 and 1889–1892
pandemics clinicians had observed awide range of gastric, catarrhal and nervous
symptoms. Furthermore, English physicians tended to be suspicious of the term
influenza, regarding it as vague Italian word for epidemic catarrh [2].1 The result
was that when in the early summer of 1918 Spanish flu reached the British Isles,
medical experts made light of the danger. Nor, when the influenza returned in
September in what appeared to be more virulent from, were preparations laid
for a pandemic [3].2 Instead, Englishmedical authorities put their faith in preven-
tive measures, such as home isolation, the ventilation of sick rooms, gargling
with saline water and handkerchiefs to ‘intercept drops of mucus’ [4, p. 90].
As Sir Arthur Newsholme, the head of the Local Government Board, and
then England’s highest authority on medical matters, informed a summit meet-
ing on influenza at the Royal Society of Medicine (RSM) on 13 November, while









































influenza travelled too rapidly and was too extensively dif-
fused. ‘I know of no public health measures that can resist
the progress of pandemic influenza’, he stated [5].
Newsholme was not alone in deprecating more forceful
preventive measures. ‘With elementary precautions influenza
is no more likely to spread than typhoid’, one English hospi-
tal doctor informed his colleagues [6]. ‘When epidemics
occur, death always happens’, stated the British Medical
Journal.3 But perhaps the most consistent medical advice
was to guard against hysteria and try to keep the epidemic
in perspective. ‘A stout heart is a great safeguard these
days’, The Times’s medical correspondent advised readers.
‘Fear is certainly the mother of infection. To go about
expecting influenza is to invite it’.4
It is sobering to read these words today in the light of the
experience of Covid-19, a pandemic that, at time of writing,
has seen the deaths of 152 000 Britons, the highest number of
any country in Europe, and more than four million people
worldwide [7]. By contrast, some 228 000 Britons perished in
the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic and in excess of 50 million
globally [8]. Of course, it is difficult to draw comparisons
between Britain’s responses to Covid-19 and the 1918–1919
Spanish influenza, a pandemic that coincided with a world
war andwhen therewas no such thing as a national health ser-
vice or intensive care units to treat patients with severe
pulmonary infections. Another key difference is that in 1918
disease surveillance was rudimentary and there were no sys-
tems such as PROMED or the World Health Organization’s
Global Outbreak and Response Network to alert governments
to trans-national disease threats and mobilize international
scientific knowledge and expertise. Nor were there triaging
systems and international regulatory mechanisms, such as
the 2005 International Health Regulations, for assessing the
threat posed by novel pathogens and coordinating supra-
national emergency responses. However, one clear parallel is
the way that in early 2020, as in 1918, medical professionals,
public health administrators and politicians deprecated the
severity of the outbreak and, rather than screen travellers at
the border and introduce community testing and rigorous
contact tracing and quarantines, advised individuals with
symptoms of coronavirus infection to self-isolate at home.
Why this was the case will keep historians and committees
of inquiry occupied for years. Certainly, it seems paradoxical
that Britain should have performed so badly given its concen-
tration of scientific and technical expertise and its detailed
contingency planning for a pandemic—planning that had
been rated the second best in the world after the USA [9].
Many theories have been advanced for the UK’s poor per-
formance, from the under-investment in healthcare under
successive Conservative governments, to the distraction of
Brexit, to political complacency and the desire to protect
Britain’s position as a leading trading nation by keeping
the border open as long as possible. These factors no
doubt all contributed to a greater or lesser extent. However,
my focus in this paper is on the role of science—and
epidemiology in particular—in the British government’s
sub-optimal response to the pandemic.
Modelling their response to SARS-CoV-2 on pandemic
influenza, some scientists advising politicians appeared to
countenance a policy of allowing the coronavirus to spread
through the population in order to generate ‘herd immunity’,
a term borrowed from vaccinology [10,11].5 It was only in
mid-March when new projections from the Imperial Collegemodeller and SAGE member, Neil Ferguson, showed the
outbreak growing faster than anticipated, and he shared a
model estimating that without social distancing and other
suppressive measures there could be as many as 250 000 UK
deaths, that on 23 March 2020 the government instituted a
national lockdown in an attempt to suppress transmission
[12]. Richard Horton, the editor of The Lancet, has described
Britain’s failure to institute tougher suppressive measures ear-
lier as ‘the greatest science policy failure for a generation’ [13].
No doubt differences between Britain and China’s political
systems—and social and cultural differences between Euro-
pean and Southeast Asian populations—also contributed to
this failure: for instance, people in Hong Kong, Taiwan and
other parts of Southeast Asia were used to quarantines and
other suppressive measures thanks to their experience of
SARS and bird flu, and Asian public health experts also
tended to be distrustful of data coming out of China. Nor
were British politicians obliged to follow the advice from epi-
demiological modellers on SAGE and other advisory groups.
However, this failure can also be seen as due, in part, to the
over-reliance onmathematical models predicated on influenza
to predict and ‘mitigate’ the spread of the coronavirus. While
poor data from China in the initial weeks of the outbreak
undoubtedly contributed to the unreliability of diseasemodel-
ling, the shortcomings of the models were exacerbated by
epidemiologists’ slowness to fully appreciate the role of quar-
antines in mitigating the impacts of previous epidemics and
the public’s willingness to restrict their social contacts when
faced with an unknown and potentially deadly pathogen.
Such insights were well known to medical historians and
had been extensively documented in the voluminous literature
on plague, cholera, Ebola and SARS but, essentially, had to be
rediscovered all over again during the pandemic of Covid-19.
Moreover, medical historians and other students of pan-
demics, including epidemiologists, often have a gut instinct
about the extent of the threat posed by an outbreak of an emer-
ging infectious disease. Sometimes, these instincts can be
wrong, as occurred in May 2014 when Pierre Rollin, a viral
haemorrhagic fever expert at the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention with experience of ten previous Ebola out-
breaks in Africa, informed the New York Times that the
outbreak in southeastern Guinea ‘was close to over’—the
epidemic would subsequently spread to five countries in
West Africa and account for more than 11 000 deaths [14].
But just as often these instincts are right: for instance, in
January 2020 John Edmunds, professor of epidemiology at
the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and a
member of SAGE, reportedly informed a scientific colleague
that the coronavirus outbreak was ‘going to be like 1918, a
terrible scourge on humanity’ [15].
I am not suggesting that such instincts are a substitute
for robust data or should take the place of mathematical
modelling; merely that any analysis of the pandemic potential
of a novel pathogen, such as SARS-CoV-2, and themanagement
of the resulting crisis should also allow for more imaginative
forms of engagement with people’s lived experiences of
pandemics and the history of quarantines. In brief, I wish to
direct attention to the question, what is gained and what is
lostwhenwe relyonmathematical technologies to, asAnderson
puts it, ‘model our way out of crisis’? [16].
Such ananalysis shouldbegin byacknowledging that epide-
miology is a statistical abstraction. While measures like R° may









































telling us when we need to lock down hard and when we can
begin to ease restrictions, it can only ever be an approximation
of reality. Like other mathematical concepts employed by
epidemiologists, the R° can never capture the full complexity
of pandemics and what epidemiologist Gideon Meyerowitz-
Katz calls the ‘tangle[d] web of interconnectivity that we call
society’ [17].
Moreover, such stochastic models are only as good as the
data that go into them and the behavioural assumptions
underpinning them. The biggest unknown in the initial
weeks and months of the outbreak was the extent to which
transmission was being driven by asymptomatic and/or
pre-symptomatic carriers. In the absence of evidence from
China to the contrary, many experts accepted the assurances
of Chinese officials that laboratory tests had detected the
majority of infections. For example, on his return from a
fact-finding mission to China in February 2020, Bruce
Aylward, co-lead of the WHO-China Joint Mission on-
Coronavirus, informed the New York Times: ‘There is no
evidence that we’re seeing only the tip of a grand iceberg,
with nine-tenths of it made up of hidden zombies shedding
virus. What we’re seeing is a pyramid: most of it is above
ground’ [18]. In fact, based on data from Singapore, Hong
Kong and China, it is now thought that between a third
and 60% of people infected with the virus may be asympto-
matic [19]. Moreover, unlike influenza, which has a two- to
four-day incubation period, on average it takes 5–6 days
and, in some cases as long as 14 days, for a person infected
with SARS-CoV-2 to develop symptoms. That gives auth-
orities a one- to two-week window in which to test, trace
and isolate asymptomatic but potentially infectious individ-
uals and suppress coronavirus infection chains before they
can spiral out of control. SARS-CoV-2 is also at least twice
as infectious as pandemic influenza, with a reproductive
ratio or R°, without interventions, of 1–4.9. That compares
to an R° of 1.8 for Spanish influenza and an R° of 1.46 for
the 2009 H1N1 swine influenza [20].
Another highly questionable assumption was that social
distancing measures should be time-limited in case of ‘behav-
ioural fatigue’ if the government locked down too soon. This
issue had first been raised by England’s Chief Medical Officer
Chris Whitty at a Downing Street coronavirus briefing in
early March and subsequently repeated by British prime min-
ister, Boris Johnson, and the UK’s chief scientific adviser, Sir
Patrick Vallance [21].6 The policy is thought to have origi-
nated either with behavioural psychologists on the Scientific
Pandemic Influenza Group on Behaviours (SPI-B), or the
Downing Street Behavioural Insights Team, also known as
the ‘Nudge Unit’. However, members of both bodies have
denied giving this advice and on 13 March SAGE explicitly
advised politicians not to delay any appropriate measures
owing to concerns over ‘difficulty maintaining beha-
viours’ [21]. Jeremy Farrar, the director of the Wellcome
Trust and a prominent member of SAGE, has since described
the concept of behavioural fatigue as ‘a peripheral idea
promoted beyond any merit or science’ [22, p. 136].
But perhaps the biggest error was the UK’s failure
to introduce strict border controls and the government’s
decision in March to abandon community test and trace.
Asian countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and
Hong Kong introduced strict border controls and quarantines
and aggressively deployed test, trace and isolate within days
of learning of the outbreak in Wuhan [23]. Similarly, Italybanned flights from China on 31 January and Germany
restricted travel to and from Wuhan in February. However,
the UK’s then Health Secretary Matt Hancock declined to
impose equivalent controls, citing advice from Whitty that
travel restrictions would only delay the spread of the disease
‘by a matter of days’ [24]. This was followed on 13 March by
Whitty’s announcement that the UK was suspending commu-
nity surveillance and that henceforth only hospitalized
patients would be tested for coronavirus. It subsequently
emerged that Imperial College had stopped modelling strat-
egies based on widespread testing after 28 January, when
Public Health England informed Ferguson that it lacked suffi-
cient capability [25]. However, the decision also appears to
have reflected an assumption in March by SAGE advisors
that there was already widespread community transmission
in Britain and that, based on the experience of influenza, there
was little that could be done to inhibit spread of the
coronavirus.7
All of which begs the question, what prompted the sudden
shift in policy and the UK government’s decision to lockdown
hard on March 23? After all, this was not the first time that
authorities had employed social distancing measures in an
attempt to ‘flatten the curve’ of an epidemic. In 2007, a study
of non-pharmaceutical interventions in the USA during the
Spanish flu pandemic showed that cities such as St Louis
where in 1918 authorities banned public gatherings and
employed other social distancing measures, succeeded in
reducing the peakof the epidemic andwere also able to quickly
restore economic activity. By contrast, cities such as Philadel-
phia that permitted Liberty Loan parades and other large
public gatherings to go ahead, suffered higher mortality
from influenza and worse economic impacts too [26].
Similarly, in England, despite the absence of directives from
the LGB, in October 1918 James Niven, the Medical Officer of
Health for Manchester, posted prominent warnings urging
Mancunians to avoid public gatherings for at least ten days
from the commencement of an influenza attack. Although
Niven’s appeals didnot prevent civilians and soldiers thronging
Manchester city centre on 11 November 1918, to celebrate the
Armistice, just 1715 Mancunians died in the second wave of
the pandemic. By contrast, in London, where no warnings
were posted about the dangers of public gatherings, there
were around 16 000 deaths [4, p. 105; 27]. The abrupt change
in mortality between the spring and autumn prompted the epi-
demiologist and early disease modeller, Major Greenwood, to
compare the increase in cases between the first and second
waves of the Russian influenza pandemic in 1890–1891 with
the first two waves of Spanish influenza. In both cases, Green-
wood was able to show that the waves had exhibited near
symmetrical rises and falls, the only difference being that in
1891 the follow-on wave of Russian flu had coincided with the
spring, whereas in 1918 the secondary wave coincided with
the autumn [28]. Newsholme, however, was unimpressed
with Greenwood’s new statistical methods, telling the summit
meeting at the RSM that no one could have anticipated the
return of influenza in the autumn and bristling at sugges-
tions that ‘more could have been done to avert the present
pandemic’ [5].
Fast forward 102 years, however, and by February 2020
China had demonstrated to the world just how effective
the lockdowns of Wuhan and other large cities in Hubei pro-
vince could be, especially when combined with aggressive









































implementation of control measures (including social distan-
cing) has reduced the community force of infection, resulting
in the progressively lower incident reported case counts’,
reported the WHO Joint Mission in February.8 Populations
in other WHO member states, including, by implication,
those of advanced Western democracies, should get ready
to embrace ‘more stringent’ social distancing, the WHO
team concluded [5, p. 22].
That report would mark a pivotal turning point in the
British response, persuading Steve Riley, a member of the
SPI-M modelling group, to revisit key behavioural assump-
tions about the public’s tolerance of lockdowns and other
social distancing measures. In particular, it would expose the
fallacy at the heart of the herd immunity strategy as Riley con-
cluded that were the virus to be allowed to spread unimpeded
the British public would spontaneously adopt social distan-
cing out of fear as infections rocketed and intensive care
units filled to capacity [22, pp. 108–110]. Such fear-induced
behaviours had been observed in Hong Kong following the
quarantining of apartment blocks during the 2003 SARS out-
break. Similar spontaneous behaviour changes had been
observed in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the 2014–16
Ebola outbreak, as well as during outbreaks of plague and
cholera in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries [29].
Moreover, though quarantines frequently provoke resistance,
they are a familiar response to outbreaks, one whose logic
has changed little since 1377 when Dubrovnik passed an ordi-
nance requiring travellers from plague-infested areas to isolate
for amonth on an island beyond the city’s limits. But curiously,
while countries like Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong were
quick to close their borders to travellers from China suspected
of harbouring the coronavirus and adopt quarantines and
social distancing, SAGE decided such measures would be of
little utility and prove counterproductive over the long term.
‘Measureswhich are too effectivemerely push all transmission
to the period after they are lifted, giving a delay but no
substantial reduction in either peak incidence or overall
attack rate,’ stated a SAGE report on non-pharmaceutical
interventions on 25 February. [‘Potential effect of non-pharma-
ceutical interventions on a COVID-19 epidemic’, SAGE, 25
February 2020. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/collections/sage-meetings-february-2020#meeting-10,-
25-february-2020, accessed 19 July 2021.] ‘There is some evi-
dence that people find quarantining hard the longer it goes
on… There is no comparable evidence for social distancing
measures, but experience suggests it is harder to comply
with a challenging behaviour over a long period than over a
short period’, read another on 13 March. [“Fifteenth
SAGE meeting on Wuhan Coronavirus”, 13 March 2020.
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publicati
ons/sage-minutes-coronavirus-covid-19-response-13-march-
2020, accessed 19 July 2020.] Little wonder that Farrar recalled
that, ‘At the end of February 2020, there was almost disbelief,
including from me, that (widescale social distancing and
lockdowns) was possible.’ [Farrar, Spike, p. 95] This was a
fundamental imaginative failure. As Gabriel Leung, a leading
Hong Kong infectious disease expert, argued at a presentation
at the London School of Hygiene and Medicine (LSHTM) on
27 February, the fact that Hong Kong’s population had gone
along with quarantines and social distancing measures,
despite the deep distrust of government that followed the
social unrest in the former crown colony in 2019, suggested
that, ‘If Hong Kong can do it anybody can’ [Gabriel Leung,“Nowcasting COVID-19 for Public Health Control: Learning
from the Chinese Experience for Global Preparedness”,
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 27 Febru-
ary 2020. Available at: https://lshtm.cloud.panopto.eu/
Panopto/Pages/Viewer.aspx?id=83ba0783-b1ce-4053-aaa5-
ab6600da76d8 (accessed 19 July 2020)].
The other key developmentwas the coronavirus outbreak in
Lombardy, in northern Italy, on 21 February.As the Italian Prime
Minister Giuseppe Conte ordered an immediate lockdown to
prevent hospitals in the province being overwhelmed, it
became clear that the virus had been spreading stealthily
under the radar inNorthern Europe for some time and that pro-
jections of the number of UK cases had been grossly
underestimated. Drawing on models predicated on the
transmission of avian influenza, on 16March, Ferguson recalcu-
lated the impact of mitigation and realized that long before
herd immunity could be reached, the National Health
Service would be overwhelmed [30]. This was not only because
a larger proportion of the UK population had most likely
been infected than previous models had assumed but
because modelling by age showed that a third of those aged 70
to 79 were likely to require hospitalization and 5.1% might die
(previous models had estimated the attack rate in this age
group as 16.6% with an infection fatality rate of 4.3%). At best,
Ferguson calculated, a combination of all the contemplated
mitigation strategies would restrict UK deaths to 250 000.
The worst-case scenario, however, was 550 000 deaths. ‘Prior
to this epidemic, I don’t think suppression of a respiratory
disease was really an option in the modern world (even
though US cities tried it in 1918)’, Ferguson informed another
researcher at University College London. ‘China showed it was
possible, though it was late February before it was clear it had
worked’ [25].
Unfortunately, Ferguson’s bleak assessment came too late
to prevent the Cheltenham Gold Cup going ahead. On
13 March, 125 000 people converged on the Midlands for
four days of drinking and raucous cheering. Four days
later, on 17 March, SAGE called for extra social distancing
‘as soon as possible’ but it was not until 23 March that
Boris Johnson finally instructed Britons that they ‘must stay
at home’ in order to protect the NHS and ‘save lives’.9 Fergu-
son would later acknowledge that ‘mitigation was
synonymous with the acquisition of herd immunity’ and
that some 20 000 deaths could have been avoided by locking
down a week earlier [22, p. 97] (see also [31]).
In 1918, disease modelling was in its infancy and, despite
Greenwood’s efforts to warn Newsholme of a second wave
of Spanish influenza in the autumn, epidemiologists were
not at the heart of policy making. Moreover, unlike cholera
and plague, influenza was not a notifiable disease in 1918
and infectious disease experts were confident that simple pre-
ventive measures were sufficient to check its spread.
Nevertheless, revisiting Britain’s nonchalant response to the
1918–1919 influenza pandemic, Sandra Tomkins reached a
similar conclusion to Horton in 2020, finding the English
medical profession guilty of a ‘failure of expertise’. She con-
cluded: ‘The paradox emerges that Britain, with one of the
most sophisticated public health machineries of the period,
mounted one of the least effective responses to the epidemic’
[6, p. 437]. This paper has argued that Britain’s medical estab-
lishment suffered a similar failure of expertise in 2020. Unlike
in 1918, however, this failure was not due so much to









































over-reliance on epidemiology to model the coronavirus pan-
demic and anticipate the measures needed to suppress it. The
result was that rather than locking down hard in early March,
the government appeared to countenance a policy of permit-
ting the coronavirus to spread through the population in an
effort to generate herd immunity. Although this policy was
never explicitly presented to or endorsed by SAGE, herd
immunity was implicit in the mitigation scenarios modelled
by Imperial and other groups. As Ferguson told Farrar: ‘It
[mitigation] meant we weren’t trying to stop something’
[22, p. 97]. The irony is that in 1918 Greenwood and other
early pioneers of predictive epidemiology also thought it
ought to be possible to anticipate the occurrence of epidemics
and mitigate their impacts by extrapolating from epidemiolo-
gical patterns observed in the past. ‘Some who have not
sufficiently attended to the matter have objected that the con-
ception is fatalist, that it amounts to postulating of epidemic
diseases an inevitableness which deprives sanitary adminis-
tration of any hope of basis of success’, Greenwood
observed in the Ministry of Health’s Report on the Pandemic.
‘The very reverse of this is the proper inference’ [32, p. 193].
Greenwood’s words were a not-so-coded dig at News-
holme, who had earlier scoffed at his warnings of a second
wave as ‘a foolishly wild guess’ [5, p. 12]. However, Green-
wood’s methods were enthusiastically taken up by George
Newman, the Chief Medical Officer at the new Ministry of
Healthwho answered directly to Secretary of State Christopher
Addison. In his preface to the report on thepandemic,Newman
argued that if a reliable way could be found of predicting
epidemics then their ‘ravages may be mitigated, perhaps
altogether checked’. The experience of Spanish influenza had
underlined ‘the essential solidarity of all mankind in the
matter of epidemic sickness’, he continued. Measures such as
sanitary cordons and quarantines could only delay pandemics,
not prevent them. Anticipating the establishment of the Health
Division of the League of Nations, Newman argued that what
was needed was a ‘supra-national system of preventive medi-
cine’. In the meantime, Newman made influenza a notifiable
disease and appointed a standing committee of the medical
heads of various Whitehall departments to share ‘intelligence’
on diseases with epidemic and pandemic potential. Despite
these innovations, however, Newman was ‘gloomy’ about the
prospects for preventive medicine. ‘That we have just passed
though one of the great sicknesses of history… is an experience
which should dispel any easy optimism of the kind. No
instructed epidemiologist can say that the world may not
have to endure during the next half century other plagues of
the first order of severity’ [33].
Writing in the midst of a severe coronavirus pandemic that
few people anticipated, that is a verdict with which most
experts, including epidemiologists, ought to concur. Review-
ing the history of influenza in 1920, Greenwood blamed the
Spanish influenza pandemic on a combination of urban over-
crowding and ‘the provision of countless incubators, whether
in garrisons, war-time factories or abnormally overcrowded
and ill-ventilated means of transport’ [32, p. 190]. But whereas
a century agowemight have expected epidemics to be circum-
scribed by geography, today, thanks to international jet travel
and faster rail and shipping connections, a novel pathogen
emerging in one part of the world can be anywhere on the
globe within a matter of days. Nor, despite the advances in
microbiology, immunology, vaccinology and preventivemedicine since 1919, are we any closer to being able to predict
when influenza, or any other pandemic virus, will emerge or
to what extent we can mitigate its impact on human popu-
lations. As the late American virologist, Edwin Kilbourne,
observed in 2006: ‘We can prepare, but with the realization
that no amount of hand-washing, hand wringing, public edu-
cation or gauze masks will do the trick’ [34]. Nor should we
make the mistake again of allowing mathematical models to
become a substitute for other, more imaginative forms of
engagement with pandemics. Even now, hardly a day goes
by without some announcement about the R°, but as useful
as this measure may be for plotting the rate of increase of the
coronavirus and the effectiveness of vaccines in preventing
hospitalisations and deaths, it does not tell us when or how
we will be delivered from our pandemic purgatory, much
less what we need to do to prevent disaster recurring. As
Tedros Ghebreyesus, the WHO’s Director General, remarked
in June 2019, on the six-month anniversary of the outbreak
in Wuhan: ‘None of us could have imagined how our
world—and our lives—would be thrown into turmoil by
this new virus’.10
We cannot allow our imaginations to fail us so catastro-
phically again.Data accessibility. This article has no additional data.
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